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CARBON TAXES AND COMPENSATION OPTIONS 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the effects an increase in the Irish carbon tax would have on 
households’ incomes, and assesses potential options for compensating 
households. While a carbon tax rise would disproportionately affect lower-income 
households in isolation, we show that such households can be left financially better 
off on average by using the revenues raised to increase social welfare benefits and 
the state pension. We also show that a targeted increase in tax credits, maximum 
rates of welfare payments and Child Benefit can achieve the same distributional 
result as a lump-sum ‘cheque in the post’, but with less administrative cost and 
complexity. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is among the most pressing issues facing policymakers around the 
world. There is a broad scientific consensus that this is occurring because of the 
accumulation of greenhouse gases (including carbon dioxide) in the atmosphere, 
with temperatures forecast to rise by 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 and 2°C by the 
end of the century (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2014, 
2018). While there is uncertainty about the precise economic and social costs 
associated with this rise in temperatures,1 the European Union has committed to 
achieving a 30 per cent reduction on 2005 emission levels by 2030, setting 
ambitious national targets for emissions reductions including 20 per cent for 
Ireland by 2020 and 30 per cent by 2030.  
Successive governments have envisaged a key role for carbon taxes in meeting 
these targets (Government of Ireland, 2007, 2011, 2018), with the Climate Change 
Advisory Council (2018) recommending that the carbon tax, currently set at a rate 
of €20/tonne of CO2, rise to €80 by 2030. By putting a price on carbon, a tax 
addresses the divergence between the private and social costs of emissions that 
lead to their excessive production in a market economy. Such taxes are easy to 
administer, cheap to collect and difficult to avoid. In addition, a large economic 
literature suggests that a carbon tax is the most efficient way of incentivising 
carbon abatement; that is, of achieving a given reduction in carbon emissions at 
the lowest economic cost.2  
 
                                                          
 
1  See Nordhaus (2007) and Stern (2006). Some have argued that uncertainty around these costs is itself an argument for 
taking action, analogous to taking out an insurance policy (Wagner and Weitzman, 2015). 
2  This goes back as far as Baumol and Oates (1971) and Weitzman (1974). See Metcalf (2019) for an accessible summary 
of this literature and discussion of arguments in favour of a carbon tax over cap-and-trade schemes, namely less 
administrative complexity, damaging price volatility and potential for adverse policy interactions.  
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However, there is also widespread recognition that carbon taxes can have 
distributional consequences that policymakers may be concerned about and want 
to ameliorate.3 This arises largely because certain groups – especially lower-income 
households – spend a disproportionate share of their incomes on carbon-intensive 
goods, in particular heating fuel. As a result, a carbon tax can have a regressive 
impact on the living standards of these households in the absence of an 
accompanying package of compensation measures.  
This paper assesses the effects of an illustrative €10 per tonne rise in the Irish 
carbon tax on households’ incomes, as well as some potential options for 
compensating households. It does so taking as given the behaviour of households 
and firms, and abstracting from the wider effects on the economy such a tax may 
have. For example, we do not account for changes in prices (beyond those directly 
arising from the higher carbon tax) firms charge for their products because of 
changes to input prices or processes, nor the responses of households to such 
changes in the relative prices of goods. This allows us to isolate the immediate 
effects of increasing the carbon tax on households’ incomes and to identify the 
groups likely to be disproportionately affected without compensation (and so to 
design packages of measures to compensate them).  
In the longer run, both households and firms will respond to the change in relative 
prices brought about by the higher carbon tax by changing the goods and services 
they consume and produce, assisted by new technologies that emerge in part 
because of investment prompted by the higher carbon tax. As a result, many 
households will not bear the burden of the increased carbon tax suggested here. 
For example, when next replacing their car, some households may take account of 
the higher cost of fuel and decide to purchase an electric or smaller vehicle, 
reducing their fuel consumption and avoiding the extra carbon tax they would be 
subject to without any change in behaviour.  
Like almost all taxes, a carbon tax also has implications for economic efficiency. In 
particular, as it is levied on top of existing taxes (and transfers), a higher carbon tax 
exacerbates the ‘deadweight loss’ created by existing taxes on labour, capital or 
consumption. If revenues raised by a carbon tax are recycled by lowering these 
other taxes, the reform may yield a ‘double dividend’, with both environmental 
benefits and a boost to economic growth arising from the reduction in economic 
inefficiency.4 While incorporating these effects is outside the scope of this paper, 
we draw on other evidence of these where possible. 
 
                                                          
 
3  In an Irish context, recognition of this dates back to at least Scott (1992) and O’Donoghue (1997). More recently, Callan 
et al. (2009), Healy (2003) and Clinch and Healy (2000) have all examined the distributional impact of carbon taxes and 
potential compensation packages. This paper updates and develops this work by using the most recent available data 
(the 2015–16 Household Budget Survey), considering a broader range of compensation packages, and examining the 
distribution of losses across a wider range of groups. 
4  For a good discussion of the conditions under which a double dividend can occur, see Goulder (2013). 
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The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some background on 
the operation of the carbon tax in Ireland and the policy context for considering 
increases to this. Section 3 examines the initial impact of a €10 increase in the 
carbon tax on households’ incomes and fuel poverty. Section 4 assesses some 
options for compensating households for this increase; Section 5 concludes the 
report. Our use of a €10 increase is purely illustrative, and should not be taken as 
a recommendation of the authors or the ESRI. While somewhat larger or smaller 
changes will have proportionally similar impacts, the effects of the compensation 
options considered may differ for substantially larger changes.  
2 CARBON TAX: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
Ireland introduced a carbon tax in Budget 2010 at a rate of €15 per tonne of CO2 
emissions. In doing so, it joined a small group of most Nordic countries, led by 
Finland in 1990. While the then (Fianna Fáil and Green Party) government’s 
National Recovery Plan announced that this would rise to €25 per tonne in 2012 
and to €30 per tonne in 2014, the subsequent (Fine Gael and Labour) coalition 
government decided not to proceed with the 2012 increase. They did, however, 
raise the carbon tax by €5 in 2014 to €20 per tonne, at which it has stood since.  
The carbon tax was initially applied only to transport fuels, oils and gas. In 2013 the 
coalition government extended it to cover other solid fuels, including coal and peat 
sold commercially for residential use. These had originally been exempted, along 
with solid fuels used in combined heat and power plants, and – more significantly 
– sectors covered by the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), notably 
the electricity generation sector. 
The ETS is an example of a ‘cap and trade’ scheme, where a limit is placed on the 
overall amount of greenhouse gases that can be emitted by covered sectors, and 
companies in those sectors are required to hold tradable ‘allowances’ (permits) to 
produce emissions. The trade of these allowances with other companies covered 
by the scheme generates a price on carbon, encouraging emissions reductions by 
the companies who can do so at the lowest cost in the same way as would a carbon 
tax. While the EU’s ETS is the world’s largest such scheme, covering around 11,000 
power stations and manufacturing plants, allowances traded at less than €10 per 
tonne between 2012 and 2018: well below the rate needed to meet the targets the 
EU has set for emission reduction across these sectors. This was in part driven by 
the issuance of surplus allowances in the initial phase of the ETS (including to many 
heavy polluters) for free. Despite a reform of the system in April 2018 that will 
reduce the number of allowances traded, research suggests that the carbon price 
is too low to achieve the level of long-run emission reductions targeted across the 
sectors covered by the ETS (Climate Change Advisory Council, 2018). 
To reduce emissions in the sectors not coved by the ETS, EU Member States have 
adopted binding national targets set out in the European Commission’s ‘effort-
sharing’ legislation. These aim for a 10 per cent reduction in EU emissions compared 
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to 2005 levels by 2020, and 30 per cent by 2020. National targets are determined 
by GDP per capita, with Ireland among those agreeing to a 20 per cent reduction by 
2020 and a 30 per cent reduction by 2030. Given that less than a third of Irish 
emissions are covered by the ETS (Climate Change Advisory Council, 2018), meeting 
these targets will require a significant domestic policy response affecting large parts 
of the Irish economy.  
While Figure 1 shows that non-ETS emissions fell between 2008 and 2012, they 
have risen as the economy has recovered, and have exceeded the annual effort-
sharing limits since 2016. Official projections suggest that, given current planned 
measures, Ireland will exceed its annual limit by around 25 per cent in 2020 and by 
more than 40 per cent in 2030, with additional planned measures making little 
difference to the level of underperformance. The effort-sharing legislation allows 
some flexibility for the purchase of emissions allowances to meet targets, but as 
the Climate Change Advisory Council (2018, pp. 78–79) has pointed out, this merely 
delays the timing of reductions, or – if sustained into the future – represents a 
significant, permanent, expenditure with no local benefits.5 
In addition to European Union and other international commitments (including the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement), Ireland has set a national policy objective 
of transitioning to a low-carbon economy by 2050 (Government of Ireland, 2015, 
2018; Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment, 2014). 
Successive governments have envisaged a key role for the carbon tax in meeting 
this objective, in particular to incentivise reductions in emissions from the transport 
and residential sectors. While estimating the effect of carbon taxes on emissions is 
difficult (not least because there have been so few broad-based carbon taxes in 
place for long enough to assess), the best international evidence suggests they lead 
to reductions in emissions at relatively small costs to the wider economy.6  
 
                                                          
 
5  The EU’s effort-sharing legislation also allows reductions in emissions below annual limits in certain years to contribute 
towards meeting targets in later years. As a result, while Ireland will exceed its annual limit by 25% in 2020, it will 
exceed the cumulative target to 2020 by only about 5% 
6  See Metcalf (2019, pp. 26–33) for an accessible summary of this work. 
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FIGURE 1 IRELAND’S NON-ETS GREENHOUSE EMISSIONS RELATIVE TO TARGETS 
 
 
Source:  Projections and limits from Climate Change Advisory Council (2018). Historic non-ETS emissions from the EPA’s 
National Emissions Inventory, available at www.epa.ie/pubs/reports/air/airemissions/ghgemissions2017. 
Note:  ‘With additional measures’ scenario assumes the government’s 2020 renewable and energy efficiency targets set 
out in the National Renewable Energy Action Plan and National Energy Efficiency Action Plan are met. 
 
Research by de Bruin and Yakut (2018, 2019) concludes the same for Ireland, finding 
that the current level of the carbon tax is far too low to achieve the targeted level 
of emission reductions. A similar conclusion was reached by the Climate Change 
Advisory Council (2018), who recommended increasing the tax to €30 in Budget 
2019 and to €80 by 2030, alongside measures to compensate lower-income 
households. This evidence was considered by the Oireachtas Committee on Climate 
Action, set up to respond to the report and recommendations of the Citizens’ 
Assembly (2018) on ‘How the state can make Ireland a leader in tackling climate 
change’.7 In its report, the Committee called on the Minister for Finance to ‘set out 
a carbon price trajectory that rises to €80 per tonne by 2030’, to ‘be implemented 
when an evidenced-based plan is in place to increase supports and incentives for 
climate action measures, including the protection of those vulnerable to fuel 
poverty’. The Committee also recommended that the government should ‘prior to 
the introduction of any increase in carbon taxation, examine the impacts on low-
income families and on the basis of these findings, introduce specific policy 
measures to assist those who may not be in a position to immediately transition 
from fossil fuels, including the potential use of social protection mechanisms, such 
as tax credits and welfare payments’. It is to these issues that this paper now turns.  
 
                                                          
 
7  The Citizens’ Assembly was established by the Houses of the Oireachtas to consider five specific matters and make 
recommendations to the Houses of the Oireachtas. See www.citizensassembly.ie for more details. 
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3 HOW WOULD A €10 CARBON TAX RISE AFFECT HOUSEHOLDS? 
This section examines the impact of a €10 rise in the carbon tax on households, 
holding fixed their behaviour and that of firms, while assuming government policy 
remains otherwise unchanged. This allows us to use household survey data 
collected by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) to identify groups of households that 
could be disproportionately affected by the tax rise if it were made in isolation.8  
A carbon tax rise raises revenue that can be used to finance spending increases or 
tax reductions elsewhere to compensate households for the effects of the higher 
carbon tax. It therefore makes most sense to think about the combined or net effect 
of these measures taken together, as we do in Section 4.9 Nevertheless, we now 
proceed to examine the initial ‘uncompensated’ effect on households’ incomes (in 
Section 3.1) and on measures of fuel poverty (in Section 3.2) to inform our choice 
of these measures, and to provide evidence on the distribution of losses within 
some of these groups. 
3.1 Effect on household income 
The Revenue Commissioners estimate that a €10 rise in the carbon tax would raise 
€213 million per year in 2019, or €125 per household. Partly because this is levied 
on motor oils including petrol and diesel, not all revenues are directly remitted by 
households: some will come from businesses, in particular hauliers.10 Using the 
2015–16 Household Budget Survey (HBS), we estimate that around €150 million 
per year is remitted directly by households: €89 each per year, or €1.71 per week. 
This revenue is not raised from households equally. Figure 2 shows that in cash 
terms, the carbon tax raises more from higher income households, with the 
average weekly loss in the highest-income decile (tenth of the population) almost 
twice as large as that in the lowest-income decile. However, these cash losses 
correspond to a much larger loss as a proportion of disposable income for lower-
income households, falling from an average of 0.40 per cent in the very lowest-
income decile to 0.10 per cent in the highest-income decile. This pattern matches 
the findings of previous research, which has led many to characterise increases to 
a carbon tax as regressive.11 
 
 
                                                          
 
8  Appendix 2 outlines the methodology used to estimate the impact of the higher carbon tax. In sum, this combines data 
on household expenditure with a carbon tax model developed by researchers at the ESRI.  
9  This is true whether or not revenues are earmarked or ‘hypothecated’ for this specific purpose. In most cases the 
amount of revenue raised by a tax does not determine the amount spent on any particular purpose (making the claimed 
hypothecation meaningless), while in the few cases where it does there is little reason to think that the optimal level 
of spending should be given by the amount raised in tax (making it inefficient).  
10  This is not to say that households or firms bear the economic incidence of the tax in these proportions. 
11  A large literature examining first-round effects by holding prices and behaviour fixed has arrived at this conclusion, 
including Pearson and Smith (1991) for seven European countries, and Callan et al. (2009) for Ireland.  
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FIGURE 2 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF UNCOMPENSATED €10 RISE IN THE CARBON TAX 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015–16 HBS. 
Notes:  Deciles of household income equivalised using CSO equivalence scales. Incomes and expenditures uprated to 2019 
levels using actual and forecast average hourly earnings and Consumer Price Index (CPI) growth from McQuinn et 
al. (2019). 
 
However, looking at losses from an indirect tax rise as a proportion of income can 
give a misleading impression. This is because, at any given point in time, low-income 
households typically spend a lot (and therefore pay a lot of indirect taxes) relative 
to their incomes. But households cannot spend more than their income indefinitely. 
Over a lifetime, income and expenditure must be equal (except for bequests given 
and received and the possibility of dying in debt). Households spending a lot relative 
to their income at any given point in time are often those experiencing only 
temporarily low incomes and either borrowing or running down their savings in 
order to maintain their expenditure smoothly at a level more befitting their lifetime 
resources.12 
When looked at as a percentage of expenditure instead, the pattern – while still 
reasonably characterised as regressive – is less pronounced. Without 
compensation, households in the bottom half of the income distribution would on 
average see losses of around 0.25 per cent of total expenditure, compared to 
between 0.15 per cent and 0.22 per cent for those in the top half of the distribution. 
The primary reason for this is that heating costs represent a larger share of total 
expenditure for lower-income households than for better-off households.  
 
                                                          
 
12  Such temporarily low incomes can arise for a variety of reasons including periods of study, unemployment, and time 
out of the labour market to raise children, as well as retirees drawing on past savings. 
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As noted above, this analysis holds prices and the behaviour of both firms and 
households fixed to identify the first-round impacts of a rise in the carbon tax. 
However, in the medium to longer run, this may feed through into higher prices for 
other goods that make intensive use of fossil fuels in their production, and might 
change the returns to labour and capital. Research for the United States suggests 
that these ‘source-side’ impacts are progressive, and may even entirely offset the 
regressive ‘use-side’ impacts even before compensation.13  
Losses before compensation also differ substantially by household type. Figure 3 
shows both the average loss and the distribution of losses for a number of types of 
household. Average losses (both median and mean) are smallest for single adults 
and lone parents, and highest for couples and ‘other’ households (which comprise 
multiple single adults or multiple generations of families living in shared 
accommodation). This pattern also holds in the tails of the distribution, as shown 
by the square marker for the 10th percentile (p10) of losses (the amount that only 
a tenth of the population lose by less than) and the diamond marker for the 90th 
percentile (p90, the amount that that only a tenth of the population lose by more 
than). 
 
FIGURE 3 IMPACT OF UNCOMPENSATED €10 RISE IN THE CARBON TAX, BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015–16 HBS. 
Note:  Expenditures uprated to 2019 levels using actual and forecast CPI growth from McQuinn et al. (2019). 
 
 
                                                          
 
13  Rausch et al. (2011), Horowitz et al. (2017) and Goulder et al. (2018). Work exploiting input–output tables to account 
for the knock-on effects of a rise in carbon taxes on the prices of other goods (but not changes in the returns to factors 
of production) finds that carbon taxes remain regressive with respect to income; see Wier et al. (2005) for Denmark, 
Kerkhof et al. (2008) for the Netherlands and de Bruin and Yakut (2018) for Ireland. 
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The reason for this pattern is illustrated by Figure 4. Median, mean, p10 and p90 
losses rise almost uniformly in line with household size, meaning bigger households 
see larger cash losses than smaller households. However, losses per person 
actually decline with household size, reflecting efficiencies of scale that exist within 
households. Figure 4 also shows the distribution of losses by household tenure 
type. On each of the measures, renters (both local authority tenants and private 
renters) see smaller losses than owner-occupiers. This is in part again because of 
household size (as households that are owner-occupiers are on average larger), but 
also has to do with where these households live.  
 
FIGURE 4  IMPACT OF UNCOMPENSATED €10 RISE IN THE CARBON TAX, BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND TENURE 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015–16 HBS. 
Notes:  Expenditures uprated to 2019 levels using actual and forecast CPI growth from McQuinn et al. (2019). 
 
Given that almost 90 per cent of those renting do so in an urban area (and a quarter 
do so in Dublin), it is unsurprising that – as Figure 4 shows – mean, median p10 and 
median p90 losses are smaller in urban areas and Dublin than elsewhere. This is 
largely a result of the greater expenditure on fuel, in particular motor fuel. While 
to some extent this may be unavoidable given limited local options for public 
transport, the larger average losses in rural areas are driven by commuters 
travelling substantial distances for work or education. Indeed, those in the top half 
of rural losses spend enough on motor fuel to drive 1,100 kilometres per week, 
with the corresponding figure for those in the top 10 per cent of rural losses almost 
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2,000 kilometres.14 Rural households driving fewer kilometres than average would 
see much smaller losses (20 per cent smaller, on average) than their heavier-driving 
neighbours, who tend to be much better off, with average incomes almost 40 per 
cent higher. This aligns with previous research (Tol et al., 2009) that found that 
Irish motor fuel use is highly concentrated among relatively few households, with 
its use greatest in the commuter belt areas surrounding Dublin, Cork, Limerick and 
Galway (classified as rural areas in the HBS). 
 
FIGURE 5  IMPACT OF UNCOMPENSATED €10 RISE IN THE CARBON TAX, BY HOUSEHOLD LOCATION 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015-16 HBS. 
Note:  Expenditures uprated to 2019 levels using actual and forecast CPI growth from McQuinn et al. (2019). 
 
3.2 Energy poverty 
While intensive use of motor fuels is an important factor in determining who could 
experience the largest losses from an uncompensated carbon tax, so too is high 
expenditure on fuel for heating. This has led some to worry about the possible 
effects of an increased carbon tax on energy poverty, which the government 
defines as ‘an inability to heat or power a home to an adequate degree’ 
(Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources, 2016).  
However, measuring energy poverty is a difficult task, and one on which there is no 
agreed international approach. Many countries measure energy poverty as the 
 
                                                          
 
14  These are calculated on the basis of the average fuel efficiency of new cars first registered in 2011 (taken from the UK’s 
Vehicle Certification Agency) and average fuel prices nationally. Using the average efficiency of new cars first registered 
in 2001 yields figures of 873 and 1,397 kilometres respectively. 
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proportion who spend more than a certain share of their disposable income on 
energy. But this can be very sensitive to the ultimately arbitrary income threshold 
used, and to whether disposable income is defined before or after housing costs 
(AHC income).15 In addition, expenditure-based measurements can exclude some 
whose incomes are so low that they decide to spend less than, say, 10 per cent of 
their incomes on energy and leave their home inadequately heated.16 
This has led some countries, such as the UK, to define energy poverty on the basis 
of the estimated expenditure needed to heat a home adequately, rather than what 
households actually report spending. However, this approach requires detailed 
information on dwellings that may not be available, and is sensitive to the precise 
assumptions made about energy efficiency and sources. Partly for these reasons, 
other countries have adopted subjective measures, based on questions asked in 
surveys about whether households have had to go without heating in the past 12 
months, whether the dwelling was not kept adequately warm because of 
affordability issues, and whether the household was unable to pay utility bills on 
time for financial reasons.  
While all these metrics have been discussed in Ireland at some point,17 the 2011 
Warmer Homes strategy decided on an official definition based on reported 
expenditure (Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources, 
2011). This set out a ‘core indicator’ of energy poverty defined as a household 
spending more than 10 per cent of its income (after housing cost) on energy 
services, and supplementary indicators of ‘severe’ and ‘extreme’ fuel poverty 
defined as spending more than 15 per cent and 20 per cent respectively.18  
Table 1 displays our estimates of these official measures in 2019, along with a 
subjective measure based on a self-reported inability to afford keeping a dwelling 
adequately warm.19 It shows that although 17.4 per cent of all households would 
be considered in fuel poverty on the basis of the official 10 per cent measure, only 
8.7 per cent report not being able to afford to keep their home warm. This self-
reported measure corresponds more closely to the official ‘severe’ and ‘extreme’ 
energy poverty measures, illustrating the arbitrariness of expenditure-based 
definitions.  
 
                                                          
 
15  As the amount spent on housing in part reflects preferences for consumption, measuring disposable income after 
housing costs means treating a family who decide to live e.g. in a larger house with a garden as ‘poorer’ than a family 
with identical income but who live in a smaller house without a garden.  
16  Coyne et al. (2018) find evidence consistent with this in their study of an energy efficiency upgrade scheme in Ireland. 
This led to much smaller than expected energy savings, as households responded to the increased efficiency of their 
dwellings by increasing ‘thermal comfort’. 
17  See, for example, Scott et al. (2008), who discuss the extent and measurement of fuel poverty in Ireland.  
18  The more recent 2016 Strategy to Combat Energy Poverty committed to establishing an Energy Poverty Advisory Group 
to review and report to the minister on ‘an appropriate methodology for measuring and tracking energy poverty levels 
in Ireland’. However, this group has yet to be convened or to meet.  
19  The subjective measure refers to 2015 rather than 2019. Given the strength of income growth since then, this 
proportion may have fallen further, although sharp increases in housing costs over the same period are likely to work 
in the opposite direction.  
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TABLE 1  ENERGY POVERTY ESTIMATES BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE  
  Expenditure measures (as % of after-housing-cost income) 
 Subjective 
measure 
>20% >15% >10% >10%, after 
tax rise 
All households 8.7 5.3 8.6 17.4 18.1 
      
Single adult 10.9 13.2 18.7 29.3 30.0 
Lone parent 23.4 8.5 14.9 31.1 32.5 
Couple without children 6.1 3.7 6.2 12.0 12.9 
Couple with children 6.9 2.2 3.6 9.3 10.0 
Retired single 5.6 9.9 19.6 41.4 42.8 
Retired couple 3.9 3.0 5.7 17.7 18.7 
Other 10.8 3.5 5.5 10.6 11.2 
      
Owner-occupier 5.8 3.7 6.7 15.3 16.1 
Rented from local authority 19.4 6.4 12.1 26.1 27.5 
Other rented 13.9 9.9 13.5 20.6 21.0 
      
Rural 7.2 5.5 9.8 19.4 20.2 
Urban 9.4 5.2 8.1 16.6 17.4 
      
Border, Midland & West 7.6 6.1 10.0 20.2 21.5 
Dublin 8.1 4.5 6.5 13.0 13.4 
Rest of the Republic 9.7 5.2 9.2 18.6 19.4 
      
Household size: 1 person 8.4 11.8 19.1 34.5 35.5 
2 8.4 3.9 7.1 16.3 17.3 
3 8.8 3.6 5.3 11.0 12.0 
4 8.6 2.6 4.0 9.0 9.7 
5 or more 9.7 2.6 4.0 9.5 9.5 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2015 Survey of Income and Living Conditions and 2015–16 HBS. 
Note:  Table shows share of households reporting an inability to afford adequately heating their home (‘subjective 
measure’) and the share spending more than the specified percentage of after housing cost (AHC) income on light 
and heat. Incomes and expenditures uprated to 2019 levels using actual and forecast average hourly earnings and 
CPI growth from McQuinn et al. (2019). 
 
This is even more apparent when one looks at the measures by household type. 
Although only 6 per cent of single retired adults report being unable to afford to 
keep their home adequately warm, over 40 per cent would be considered in fuel 
poverty on the basis of the official 10 per cent measure. Similarly, while almost a 
third of single working-age adults are classified as being in fuel poverty using the 
official 10 per cent measure, only 10.9 per cent report an inability to keep their 
house adequately warm. However, lone parents stand out as a group experiencing 
high rates of fuel poverty on both the subjective and official expenditure measures 
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(at 23.4 and 31.1 per cent respectively), as do households renting from local 
authorities (19.4 per cent and 26.1 per cent). 
Table 1 also shows our estimate of the impact an uncompensated €10 increase in 
the carbon tax would have on the official fuel poverty measure. Overall, it would 
lead to a small increase of 0.7 percentage points in the share of households 
spending more than 10 per cent of their after-housing costs income on fuel. While 
there is relatively little variation in this across groups of households, the increase 
corresponds to a slightly larger proportional rise for working-age couples (with and 
without children), who on average spend a lower share of their incomes on fuel 
than others. However, this small rise in the official measure of fuel poverty does 
not take account of any increase to households’ incomes from possible 
compensation packages, a topic this paper now considers. 
4 HOW COULD HOUSEHOLDS BE COMPENSATED? 
So far we have examined the first-round impact of a rise in the carbon tax without 
considering how the revenues raised are spent. While this allows us to identify the 
groups that could be disproportionately affected by an increase in the carbon tax, 
it can create a misleading impression as to how households will be affected in even 
the short run. This section now assesses the net impact of six potential packages 
of reforms on households’ incomes and discusses their potential broader economic 
effects. In doing so, it is restricted by data limitations to looking for the most part 
at average effects across household and income groups.20 While we find that most 
of these can be left financially better off on average by the packages considered, 
there will be some higher emitters within these groups who will be worse off 
without a change in their behaviour. 
4.1 Package A: lump-sum rebate 
The first option we examine is one that the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Climate 
Action has explicitly called on the government to consider: to redistribute the 
revenues raised from an increase in carbon taxes to households in the form of a 
lump sum rebate or dividend. Figure 6 shows that after taking account of this lump 
sum rebate, households are on average 0.07 per cent better off, with lower-income 
households gaining the most as a proportion of their income (0.40 per cent 
compared to less than 0.10 per cent in the top half of the income distribution). This 
progressive pattern after compensation contrasts with the regressive pattern 
before compensation seen in Figure 2, and illustrates the importance of 
considering a reform package as a whole.21  
 
                                                          
 
20  See Appendix 2 for more detail on the data and methodology used to calculate these average effects.  
21  This should not be read as support for hypothecating revenues raised from any tax increase. As noted above, 
hypothecation is either inefficient (e.g. linking the amount spent on training programmes to the revenues raised from 
a tax that decline in an economic downturn, when they are most needed) or an exercise in deceit (e.g. claims that 
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FIGURE 6  DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF €10 RISE IN THE CARBON TAX AND LUMP SUM REBATE 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015–16 HBS. 
Notes:  Deciles of household income equivalised using CSO equivalence scales. Incomes and expenditures uprated to 2019 
levels using actual and forecast average hourly earnings and CPI growth from McQuinn et al. (2019). 
 
However, Figure 6 also shows that while the lump sum transfer leaves households 
in each decile better off on average, a minority (23 per cent) of households would 
be worse off even after compensation. This proportion is largest in the highest-
income three deciles at around a third, but includes 12 per cent of households in 
the lowest-income three deciles. These are mostly households who spend a very 
large share of their income on fuel, alongside some larger households for whom 
the lump sum transfer is insufficient to offset the increased carbon tax. Indeed, 
Table A.1 in Appendix 1 shows that while single-person households gain by an 
average of 0.28 per cent of disposable income, households consisting of three or 
more people are on average no better off, with around a third of such households 
worse-off. 
In principle, the lump sum rebate could be designed to mitigate the effects on larger 
households by accounting for household size, but this would exacerbate what are 
already significant administrative burdens. The government does not currently hold 
any register of households, meaning it would need to collect and verify the address 
and composition of every household in the country. Dispersing the payment as a 
‘cheque in the post’, as has been suggested by some, would be costly and require 
establishing new payment infrastructure separate from those already used for the 
 
                                                          
 
revenues raised from taxes on driving are somehow ring-fenced for road construction and maintenance when the 
amount spent on such activities vastly exceeds the monies raised).  
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
0.00%
0.10%
0.20%
0.30%
0.40%
0.50%
Lowest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highest All
%
 st
ill
 w
or
se
 o
ff 
af
te
r r
eb
at
e
Ga
in
/lo
ss
 a
s %
 o
f d
isp
os
ab
le
 in
co
m
e
Decile of equivalised disposable income
% worse off after compensation (RHS) Gain as a % disposable income (LHS)
 15 
 
income tax, PRSI and social welfare systems.22 It would also mean that households 
would only receive compensation for the higher carbon tax with a substantial lag, 
unless the payment was made at regular intervals (increasing the administrative 
costs and complexity further).  
Ireland operates a sophisticated and an extensive tax and social welfare system. 
Using SWITCH, the ESRI’s tax and benefit microsimulation model, we estimate that 
all but 1 per cent of households receive some benefit or make some payment via 
the income tax, PRSI and social welfare systems.23 Using these may then offer a 
significantly less complex and costly means of compensating households and 
achieving the objective set by the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Climate Action: 
protecting those on low incomes from the effects of increases to the carbon tax.  
4.2 Package B: increase in income tax credits 
The possibility of using revenues raised from higher carbon taxes to reduce carbon 
emissions while increasing economic growth is an issue that has received much 
attention in the economic literature. Achieving this ‘double dividend’ depends 
crucially on the extent of existing tax distortions and the degree to which a carbon 
tax exacerbates these.24 Research examining the issue for Ireland has suggested 
that such a dividend is possible if revenues raised are recycled through reductions 
in income taxes, but not through lump-sum rebates.25 This is because tax cuts 
improve the competitiveness of the internationally traded sector (of which labour 
costs are an important determinant), while a lump-sum rebate does not. The 
potential for such a dividend motivates our consideration of a reform package 
where the entirety of revenues raised from the carbon tax rise is used to reduce 
income taxes by increasing the personal, PAYE, earned income, home carer and 
widowed tax credit (all by 3.65 per cent).26  
Figure 7 shows that the first-round net effect of such a reform would be broadly 
regressive with respect to income. Households in the upper-middle of the income 
distribution would gain by most (around 0.20 per cent of income), while households 
in the four lowest-income deciles would be on average worse off (by around 0.15 
per cent of income). The reason for this is simply that few in the latter group of 
households earn enough to pay income tax, and so they would not gain from any 
increase to tax credits. The two highest-income deciles would on average gain by 
less than those in deciles 6–8 because the increase to tax credits represents a 
smaller proportion of their incomes than for middle-income households.  
 
                                                          
 
22  This is because these systems assess individuals at either the individual or family level (i.e. cohabiting adults and 
dependants) rather than at a household level.  
23  See Appendix 2 for a brief description of SWITCH and the data it uses. 
24  For a good discussion of the issues involved here, see Goulder (2013). 
25  See Department of Finance (2014), Conefrey et al. (2013), FitzGerald et al. (2002, 2008), Bergin et al. (2004), and 
FitzGerald and McCoy (1992). Acheson et al. (2018) also provide evidence that the efficiency costs of income taxation 
are non-trivial and higher than the current shadow price of public funds. 
26  This would correspond to a €60 rise in the personal and PAYE tax credits from their current level of €1,650. 
 16 
 
FIGURE 7  DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF €10 RISE IN THE CARBON TAX AND INCREASE IN TAX CREDITS 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015–16 HBS and SWITCH – the ESRI tax and benefit microsimulation model – run 
on the 2015 Survey of Incomes and Living Conditions (SILC). 
Note:  Deciles of household income equivalised using CSO equivalence scales. Incomes and expenditures uprated to 2019 
levels using actual and forecast average hourly earnings and CPI growth from McQuinn et al. (2019). 
 
Table A.1 in Appendix 1 shows that although this reform would on average leave 
private renters, single adults and working-age couples better off, lone parents, 
retirees and those renting from local authorities would see small losses. Again, the 
intuitive explanation for this pattern is that many within the latter groups do not 
earn enough to pay income tax, and so would not benefit from the increase to tax 
credits. And while households living in rural areas and outside Dublin would on 
average gain from the reform package, they would do so by slightly less than 
households living in urban areas and Dublin. The reason for this is that although the 
average gain from increasing tax credits is the same across those areas (median 
rural incomes having in recent years converged with those in urban areas), the 
average loss from the rise in carbon taxes is larger in rural areas.  
Unfortunately, due to data limitations we are unable to quantify the proportion of 
households who would remain worse off after this or the compensation packages 
we consider in the following sub-sections.27 However, given the pattern of gains 
and losses described above, it is reasonable to conclude that increasing income tax 
credits alone cannot achieve the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Climate Action’s 
 
                                                          
 
27  This is because we need to use a different dataset – the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) – with SWITCH 
to accurately model the effects of increasing tax credits (and welfare benefits), and this does not contain detailed 
information on consumption. To construct our measure of average net gains/losses, we combine the average losses 
from Section 3 (using the HBS) with the estimated average gains from increasing tax credits/social welfare benefits 
(using SILC) for the same income and demographic groups. 
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objective of protecting those on low incomes, at least in the short run. In the longer 
run, some individuals may respond to an income tax cut by working more, 
increasing incomes at the bottom of the distribution and acting to somewhat alter 
the regressive distributional pattern shown above. But empirical evidence for 
Ireland suggests that the responsiveness of individuals to income taxes at low levels 
of earnings is minimal, meaning the tax cut considered here is unlikely to induce 
substantial responses of this kind.28 Ultimately, it is a decision for politicians as to 
how to balance their distributional objectives with others, including those of 
economic efficiency and environmental protection. 
4.3 Package C: increase in social welfare benefits 
Given the importance attached by policymakers to protecting lower-income 
households from the impact of a higher carbon tax, we now examine the 
consequences of using the entirety of revenues raised to increase the maximum 
rates of social welfare benefits (including the state pension) by 1.35 per cent.29 
Figure 8 shows that the net effect of such a reform would be highly progressive, 
with the lower-income half of households gaining by an average of around 0.50 per 
cent of disposable income. The gain is highest for households in the second lowest-
income decile rather than the very lowest, as the lowest-income decile includes 
some households who are living off accumulated savings and not entitled to any 
contributory or means-tested benefits. Other than pensioners, most of whom are 
located in the middle deciles, few households in the top half of the income 
distribution are entitled to social welfare benefits and so do not gain from the 
increase to these. As a result, households in deciles 7–10 on average see small net 
losses from the reform, less than 0.10 per cent of disposable income. 
Table A.1 in Appendix 1 shows that lone parents and retirees are the biggest 
winners from the reform package, gaining by an average of 0.38 per cent and 0.50–
0.61 per cent respectively. This is because welfare benefits constitute a larger share 
of these households’ incomes than for working-age couples, who are higher up the 
income distribution and see small net losses on average. The other group of 
households who see substantially larger gains than average are those renting from 
local authorities, at 0.56 per cent of disposable income compared to 0.11 per cent 
for all households. 
Notably, unlike the other compensation packages we consider, rural households 
and those living outside of Dublin see slightly larger average gains than urban 
households and those living in Dublin respectively. This in part reflects the older 
age profile of rural households, with gains from the increase to the state pension in 
particular offsetting the higher average losses from the rise in the carbon tax.  
 
                                                          
 
28  Acheson et al. (2018) show that there is little ‘bunching’ in the distribution of earnings around the standard rate cut-
off, suggesting employees around this earnings level are relatively unresponsive to taxes.  
29  This corresponds to a €3.35 per week (€174.31 per year) increase in the maximum personal rate of the state pension, 
and €2.74 per week (€142.51 per year) in the maximum personal rate of jobseeker’s allowance.  
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FIGURE 8  DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF €10 RISE IN THE CARBON TAX AND INCREASE IN WELFARE RATES 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015–16 HBS and SWITCH – the ESRI tax and benefit microsimulation model – run 
on the 2015 SILC. 
Note:  Deciles of household income equivalised using CSO equivalence scales. Incomes and expenditures uprated to 2019 
levels using actual and forecast average hourly earnings and CPI growth from McQuinn et al. (2019). 
 
Compared to using revenues to reduce rates of income tax, raising maximum rates 
of welfare payments is highly unlikely to result in a ‘double dividend’ from increased 
economic activity. This is because increasing welfare payments relative to net-of-
tax earnings will – if anything – have a small negative effect for most groups on the 
financial incentive to work. However, the reform we consider also includes an 
increase to the maximum amount of Working Family Payment (previously called 
Family Income Supplement), which could improve the incentive for low-income 
families with children to work part-time, somewhat offsetting this. The likely effect 
of the reform on growth is therefore ambiguous, but possibly negative. 
4.4 Packages D–F: increase to tax credits and welfare payments 
We have seen that using revenues raised from a higher carbon tax to reduce income 
taxes primarily benefits higher-income households, while using these to increase 
maximum rates of welfare payments benefits lower-income families. It is therefore 
natural to consider a combination of the two packages, and whether this could 
achieve a similar distributional pattern to the lump-sum rebate, without the 
administrative costs and complexity. We now consider a package using revenues to 
increase income tax credits, the main working-age benefits, and Child Benefit by 
1.5 per cent, as well as the state pension by 0.5 per cent. The smaller proportional 
increase to the state pension is because of its higher level in cash terms and the 
relatively well-off position of its recipients in the income distribution.  
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FIGURE 9  DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF €10 RISE IN THE CARBON TAX AND INCREASES TO TAX CREDITS, 
CHILD BENEFIT AND WELFARE PAYMENTS 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015–16 HBS and SWITCH – the ESRI tax and benefit microsimulation model – run 
on the 2015 SILC. 
Note:  Deciles of household income equivalised using CSO equivalence scales. Incomes and expenditures uprated to 2019 
levels using actual and forecast average hourly earnings and CPI growth from McQuinn et al. (2019). 
  
The dark blue series in Figure 9 shows that the net impact of this package is strongly 
progressive, with the two lowest-income deciles gaining by an average of about 
0.40 per cent of disposable income. However, unlike with the previous package, 
which increased only maximum rates of welfare payments, this combined package 
also leaves households in the upper half of the income distribution better off on 
average, by 0.10 per cent of disposable income in decile 6 and 0.01 per cent in 
decile 10. 
Figure 9 also illustrates the distributional impact of using 75 per cent and 50 per 
cent of revenues to increase tax credits and benefits in similar proportions to 
above.30 This could be of interest if, for example, one wanted to use some of the 
revenue raised to reduce other taxes, fund energy efficiency schemes, improve 
public services or compensate some businesses for the increased costs of 
production. Although we are not able to assess the impact of such measures on 
households both for conceptual reasons and due to data limitations,31 Figure 8 
shows that one can still leave households in all but the top three deciles on average 
better off when using 75 per cent of revenues, but not 50 per cent. Indeed, in the 
latter case most deciles are on average worse off, with only the two lowest-income 
 
                                                          
 
30  Series E (F) shows the net impact of increasing tax credits, the main working-age benefits and Child Benefit all by 1.1 
per cent (0.8 per cent), as well as the state pension by 0.4 per cent (0.3 per cent). 
31  See O’Dea and Preston (2014) for a discussion of these issues.  
-0.10%
0.00%
0.10%
0.20%
0.30%
0.40%
0.50%
Lowest 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highest All
Ga
in
/lo
ss
 a
s %
 o
f d
isp
os
ab
le
 in
co
m
e
Decile of equivalised disposable income
D: All revenues E: 75% of revenues F: 50% of revenues
 20 
 
deciles seeing average gains (and even then by less than 0.10 per cent of disposable 
income). 
Table A.1 (Appendix 1) shows the average impact by household type for these 
compensation packages (labelled D, E and F for the packages using 100, 75 and 50 
per cent of revenues respectively). With each of these, lone parents are the biggest 
winners on average, as they benefit from the increase both to Child Benefit and to 
one-parent family payment. Couples with children also gain on average (except 
with the 50 per cent package), as many gain both from the increase to Child Benefit 
and that to income tax credits. Similarly, retired couples gain on average with both 
the 100 per cent and 75 per cent packages, as many have sufficient private pension 
income to benefit from the increase in income tax credits while also benefiting from 
the rise in the state pension. Single adults (both retired and of working age) do less 
well, losing a small amount on average with the 75 per cent and 50 per cent 
packages. 
As with the lump-sum rebate and tax credit measures considered above, rural 
households and those living outside of Dublin see smaller average gains (larger 
average losses) with the 100 per cent and 75 per cent (50 per cent) packages than 
those living in urban areas and Dublin. And as with the lump-sum rebate and the 
increase to maximum welfare rates, those renting from local authorities gain by 
more than owner-occupiers and other renters, reflecting their higher likelihood of 
being in receipt of the main working-age benefits. However, unlike all the measures 
considered in Sections 4.1–4.3, Table A.1 shows that larger families see the biggest 
proportional gains with each of the 100 per cent, 75 per cent and 50 per cent 
compensation packages. This reflects the fact that most of these larger families 
have multiple children, and so gain multiple times from the increase to Child 
Benefit.  
It is unclear whether the package considered here would yield a ‘double dividend’. 
This is because it consists of both a reduction in income tax (which, as we saw in 
Section 3.2, is likely to result in both less pollution and more economic activity) and 
an increase in maximum rates of welfare payments (which has an ambiguous but 
possibly negative effect on economic activity arising from the small negative effect 
for most groups on the financial incentive to work). 
5 CONCLUSIONS  
This paper has examined the first-round impacts of increasing the carbon tax by 
€10 on households’ income, and assessed a number of ways the Government could 
compensate households using some or all of the revenue raised. While a higher 
carbon tax would disproportionately affect lower-income households if there were 
no compensation for the tax rise, we show the revenues can be used to leave those 
households financially better off on average. 
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Figure 10 summarises our findings with respect to the progressivity of the main 
options we assessed. Increasing maximum rates of welfare payments would be 
highly progressive while increasing tax credits would be broadly regressive, with 
only the latter likely to yield a double dividend of both reductions in carbon 
emissions and increased economic activity. A targeted increase in tax credits, 
maximum rates of welfare payments and Child Benefit would have an almost 
identical (highly progressive) distributional pattern, as would dispersing revenues 
through a lump-sum ‘cheque in the post’, but with far less administrative cost and 
complexity.  
 
FIGURE 10  COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF MEASURES  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015–16 HBS. 
Note:  Deciles of household income equivalised using CSO equivalence scales. Incomes and expenditures uprated to 2019 
levels using actual and forecast average hourly earnings and CPI growth from McQuinn et al. (2019). 
 
Households living in rural areas and outside Dublin would, on average, gain by more 
than those living in urban areas and in Dublin with the increase to maximum rates 
of welfare payments (package C), but by less with the other three packages. 
Retirees, lone parents and those renting from local authorities would on average 
gain with all but the tax credits package (B), but by most (around 0.50 per cent of 
disposable income) with the increase to maximum rates of welfare payments (C). 
Conversely, working-age couples with and without children would on average gain 
most from an increase to tax credits (B). The targeted increase to tax credits, 
welfare payments and Child Benefit (D) would leave larger households on average 
better off than smaller families.  
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However, these averages may disguise substantial variation within groups, with 
some (higher emitting) households worse off after compensation even among 
groups that on average gain from the reform. This includes the small number of 
households (around 1 per cent of the total number) who do not pay taxes on 
personal income or receive social welfare payments, and so will not gain from the 
compensation options considered here (other than the lump-sum rebate).  
Another important caveat is that our analysis holds fixed the behaviour of 
consumers and firms. In the longer run, both will likely respond to the change in 
relative prices brought about by the higher carbon tax by changing the goods and 
services they consume or produce. In addition to reducing the losses many 
households will face from the tax rise, this is likely to shift the ultimate economic 
incidence of the carbon tax from some households and firms who are particularly 
responsive to prices onto others who are less so. Evidence for the United States 
suggests that such responses may offset the regressive impact of a higher carbon 
tax before compensation, easing policymakers’ concerns about the distributional 
impacts of raising carbon taxes.32  
Nevertheless, in determining whether – and how – to compensate households for 
an increase to the carbon tax, policymakers inevitably face trade-offs between their 
distributional and other objectives. The evidence presented in this paper can 
inform those choices, by clarifying which groups would gain and lose under the 
different options. However, ultimately it is for the political system to determine 
how to allocate resources and what objectives to prioritise.  
 
                                                          
 
32  See, for example, Rausch et al. (2011), Horowitz et al. (2017) and Goulder et al. (2018).  
 23 
 
REFERENCES 
Acheson, J., B. Stanley, S. Kennedy, and E.L.W. Morgenroth (2018). The elasticity of taxable 
income, Dublin: Department of Finance. 
Baumol, W.J. and W.E. Oates (1971). ‘The use of standards and prices for protection of the 
environment’, Swedish Journal of Economics, Vol. 71, No. 1, pp. 42–54. 
Bergin, A., J. FitzGerald, and I. Kearney (2004). The macro-economic effects of using fiscal 
instruments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Wexford: Environmental 
Protection Agency. 
Callan, T., S. Lyons, S. Scott, R.S.J. Tol, and S. Verde (2009). ‘The distributional implications 
of a carbon tax in Ireland’, Energy Policy, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 407–412. 
Climate Change Advisory Council (2018). Annual review 2018, Dublin: Climate Change 
Advisory Council. 
Clinch, J.P., and J.D. Healy (2000). ‘Cost–benefit analysis of domestic energy efficiency’, 
Energy Policy, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 113–124. 
Conefrey, T., J.D. FitzGerald, L. Malaguzzi Valeri, and R.S.J. Tol (2013). ‘The impact of a 
carbon tax on economic growth and carbon dioxide emissions in Ireland’, Journal 
of Environmental Planning and Management, Vol.  56, No. 7, pp. 934–952. 
Coyne, B., S. Lyons, and D. McCoy (2018). ‘The effects of home energy efficiency upgrades 
on social housing tenants: evidence from Ireland’, Energy Efficiency, Vol. 11, No. 8, 
pp. 2077–2100. 
De Bruin, K.C., and A.M. Yakut (2018). The economic and environmental impacts of 
increasing the Irish carbon tax, Research Series No. 79, The Economic and Social 
Research Institute, Dublin. 
De Bruin, K.C., and A.M. Yakut (2019). ‘The effects of an incremental increase in the Irish 
carbon tax towards 2030’. ESRI Working Paper No. 619, Dublin: The Economic and 
Social Research Institute. 
Department of Communications, Climate Action and Environment (2014). National policy 
position on climate action and low carbon development, Dublin: DCCAE.  
Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources (2011). Warmer Homes: a 
Strategy for Affordable Energy in Ireland, Dublin: Department of Communications, 
Energy and Natural Resources.  
Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources (2016). A strategy to 
combat energy poverty: 2016–2019, Dublin: Department of Communications, 
Energy and Natural Resources. 
Department of Finance (2014). Quantification of the economic impacts of selected 
structural reforms in Ireland, IGEES Working Paper, Dublin: Department of Finance. 
 24 
 
FitzGerald, J., A. Bergin, S. Diffney, D. Duffy, I. Kearney, S. Lyons, and L. Malaguzzi Valeri 
(2008). Medium-term review 2008–2015, Forecasting Series No. 11, Dublin: The 
Economic and Social Research Institute.  
FitzGerald, J., J. Hore, and I. Kearney (2002). A model for forecasting energy demand and 
greenhouse gas emissions in Ireland, Working Paper 146, Dublin: The Economic and 
Social Research Institute. 
FitzGerald, J. and D. McCoy (1992). The economic effects of carbon taxes, Dublin: The 
Economic and Social Research Institute. 
Goulder, L.H. (2013). ‘Climate change policy’s interactions with the tax system’, Energy 
Economics, Vol. 40, pp. S3–S11. 
Goulder, L.H., M.A.C. Hafstead, G. Kim, and X. Long (2018). Impacts of a carbon tax across 
US household income groups. What are the equity–efficiency trade-offs?, Working 
Paper No. 25181, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Government of Ireland (2007). Programme for Government: 2007–2012, Dublin: 
Government of Ireland. 
Government of Ireland (2011). The National Recovery Plan: 2011–2014, Dublin: 
Government of Ireland. 
Government of Ireland (2015). Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015, 
Dublin: Government of Ireland.  
Government of Ireland (2018). Draft National Energy & Climate Plan (NECP) 2021–2030, 
Dublin: Government of Ireland. 
Healy, J. (2003). Fuel poverty and policy in Ireland and the European Union, Studies in Public 
Policy, Dublin: The Policy Institute at Trinity College Dublin and Combat Poverty 
Agency. 
Horowitz, J., J.-A. Cronin, H. Hawkins, L. Konda, and A. Yuskavage (2017). Methodology for 
analyzing a carbon tax, OTA Working Paper No. 115, Washington, DC: Office of Tax 
Analysis. 
IPCC (2014). Climate change 2014: synthesis report, Geneva: IPCC. 
IPCC (2018). Global warming of 1.5 °C: an IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global 
warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas 
emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the 
threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate 
poverty, Geneva: World Meteorological Organization. 
Kerkhof, A.C., H.C. Moll, E. Drissen, and H.C. Wilting (2008). ‘Taxation of multiple 
greenhouse gases and the effects on income distribution: a case study of the 
Netherlands’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 67, No. 2, pp. 318–326. 
McQuinn, K., C. O’Toole, M. Allen-Coghlan, and P. Economides (2019). Quarterly Economic 
Commentary, Spring 2019, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute. 
Metcalf, G.E. (2019). On the economics of a carbon tax for the United States, BPEA 
Conference Draft, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 
 25 
 
Nordhaus, W.D. (2007). ‘A review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change’, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 686–702. 
O’Dea, C. and I. Preston (2015). ‘Can we measure who loses most from public service 
spending cuts?’, Budget Perspectives 2015, Paper 2, Dublin: The Economic and 
Social Research Institute. 
O’Donoghue, C. (1997). ‘Carbon dioxide, energy taxes and household income’. ESRI 
Working Paper No. 90, The Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin. 
Pearson, M. and S. Smith (1991). The European carbon tax: an assessment of the European 
Commission’s proposals, London: The Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Rausch, S., G.E. Metcalf, and J.M. Reilly (2011). ‘Distributional impacts of carbon pricing: a 
general equilibrium approach with micro-data for households’, Energy Economics, 
Vol. 33, pp. S20–S33. 
Scott, S. (1992). ‘Theoretical considerations and estimates of the effects on households’, 
The economic effects of carbon taxes, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research 
Institute. 
Scott, S., S. Lyons, C. Keane, D. McCarthy, and R.S.J. Tol (2008). Fuel poverty in Ireland: 
extent, affected groups and policy issues, Working Paper No. 262, Dublin: The 
Economic and Social Research Institute.  
Stern, N. (2006). Stern review on the economics of climate change, London: Government of 
the United Kingdom. 
Tol, R.S.J., N. Commins, N. Crilly, S. Lyons, and E. Morgenroth (2009). ‘Towards regional 
environmental accounts for Ireland’, Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry 
Society of Ireland, Vol. 38, pp. 105–142.  
Tovar Reaños, M.A. and M. Lynch (2019). ‘Carbon taxation in Ireland: distributional effects 
of revenue recycling policies’, ESRI Special Article, Dublin: The Economic and Social 
Research Institute. 
Wagner, G. and M.L. Weitzman (2015). Climate shock: the economic consequences of a 
hotter planet, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Weitzman, M. (1974). ‘Prices vs. quantities’, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 
477–491. 
Wier, M., K. Birr-Pedersen, H.K. Jacobsen, and J. Klok (2005). ‘Are CO2 taxes regressive? 
Evidence from the Danish experience’, Ecological Economics, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 
239–251. 
 26 
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
TABLE A.1  NET IMPACT OF CARBON TAX REFORM, AS % OF DISPOSABLE INCOME  
 
Before After compensation package: 
A B C D E F 
Single adult −0.20 0.25 0.09 0.08 0.04 −0.02 −0.08 
Lone parent −0.18 0.23 −0.06 0.38 0.52 0.34 0.17 
Couple without children −0.16 0.05 0.17 −0.07 0.01 −0.04 −0.08 
Couple with children −0.14 0.04 0.13 −0.02 0.12 0.05 −0.01 
Retired single −0.26 0.34 −0.10 0.61 0.01 −0.06 −0.13 
Retired couple −0.20 0.09 −0.01 0.50 0.11 0.03 −0.04 
Other −0.18 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.04 −0.03 
        
Owner–occupier −0.17 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.00 −0.06 
Rented from local authority −0.20 0.25 −0.01 0.56 0.36 0.22 0.08 
Other rented −0.14 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.02 
        
Rural  −0.22 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.00 −0.07 
Urban −0.15 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.05 −0.02 
        
Border, Midland & West −0.21 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.02 −0.06 
Dublin −0.12 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.00 
Rest of the Republic −0.19 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.02 −0.05 
        
Household size: 1 −0.22 0.28 0.02 0.28 0.03 −0.03 −0.10 
2 −0.18 0.08 0.09 0.19 0.08 0.01 −0.05 
3 −0.17 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.11 0.04 −0.03 
4 −0.15 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.05 −0.01 
5 or more −0.15 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.16 0.08 0.00 
        
All households −0.17 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.03 −0.03 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2015–16 HBS and SWITCH – the ESRI tax and benefit microsimulation model – run 
on the 2015 SILC. 
Note:  Incomes and expenditures uprated to 2019 levels using actual and forecast average hourly earnings and CPI growth 
from McQuinn et al. (2019). 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
The results presented in this paper are derived from an indirect tax 
microsimulation model jointly developed by researchers at the ESRI and the 
Department of Finance, and SWITCH, the ESRI’s direct tax and benefit 
microsimulation model. 
Our indirect tax model estimates the indirect taxes (VAT and excise duties, 
including carbon taxes) paid by Irish households on the basis of their reported 
expenditure, collected by the CSO’s nationally representative HBS. This is 
conducted every five years, with respondents asked to keep a diary of their 
expenditures over a two-week period, but the survey also contains information on 
less frequent expenditure items, such as insurance and durable goods. We use data 
from the latest edition of the HBS (conducted between February 2015 and 2016), 
uprating incomes and expenditures to 2019 terms using official statistics where 
available and forecasts taken from the ESRI’s Spring 2019 Quarterly Economic 
Commentary otherwise. Our model categorises which rates of VAT and excise duty 
each expenditure item is subject to, with the carbon content of fuels taken from 
official estimates. We then apply the current (May 2019) rates of VAT and excise 
duties to these uprated quantities to estimate the amount of indirect taxes paid by 
each household, and – holding quantities of goods and services purchased constant 
– how much indirect taxes they would pay with a carbon tax of €30 per tonne: a 
€10, or 50%, increase on the current level.  
While the HBS also collects information on income, it does not do so to the level of 
detail required to determine the tax liabilities and benefit entitlements of 
households. We therefore combine estimates of the average loss from higher 
indirect taxes for different income and demographic groups with the average gain 
from our simulated tax and benefit reforms estimated using SWITCH. This 
simulates the direct tax liabilities and social welfare entitlements of the Irish 
population using the nationally representative SILC. SILC is an annual household 
survey conducted by the CSO that collects detailed information on individuals’ 
incomes along with detailed demographic information. We uprate these quantities 
to 2019 terms in the same way as those in the HBS, then use SWITCH to simulate 
the net change in household disposable income for each of the six reforms detailed 
in Section 4. 
As both the HBS and SILC are nationally representative surveys, we can combine 
the estimated average loss from the higher carbon tax for various income groups 
and household types (using the HBS) with the estimated average gain from the tax 
and benefit reforms for these same groups (using SWITCH run on SILC) to compute 
an estimated average net gain. There is likely substantial variation around this 
average net gain, with some (high-emitting) households remaining worse off even 
after compensation. However, because neither HBS nor SILC contains sufficiently 
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detailed information on both incomes and expenditures, we are restricted from 
saying anything about the distribution of gains and losses, or the share of 
households remaining financially worse off after compensation.  
Both sets of estimates assume that households’ behaviour remains unchanged in 
response to a change in relative prices of goods/services and labour/leisure for the 
HBS- and SILC-derived estimates respectively. This means the results are best 
interpreted as showing the initial ‘first round’ effects of the reforms considered. In 
the medium or longer run, individuals may adjust whether and how much they 
work, while households are likely to change the composition of their expenditure 
away from more carbon-intensive products towards less carbon-intensive ones (De 
Bruin and Yakut, 2019). Although this may reduce the scale of losses relative to 
those estimated here, it is unlikely to alter the pattern of these losses unless the 
magnitude of responses also differs significantly by income level or household 
type. Forthcoming work by researchers at the ESRI (Tovar Reaños and Lynch, 2019) 
suggests that – at least on the expenditure side – this is unlikely to be the case. 
They estimate that the pattern of losses from the higher carbon tax as a share of 
disposable income looks very similar to that shown in Figure 2 even after 
accounting for changes in demand for these goods. While little evidence is 
available on the extent of labour supply responses by income level and household 
type in Ireland, the reforms to taxes and benefits considered here are unlikely to 
be of sufficient magnitude to induce substantial behavioural responses. 
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